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"This could be the first funny revolution," Lou said. "Aren't 
these guys great, Bunny? Lily Law should never have 
messed with us on the day Judy died. Look they've turned 
the parking meter into a battering ram .... 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1986 the Parliament of New Zealand passed into law the Homosexual 
Law Reform Act. That Act decriminalised (among other things)' sex 
between consenting adult men. In 1990 the Human Rights Commission 
Amendment Bill was introduced into Parliament. It proposed to amenclmerrr 
the Human Rights Commission Act by adding to the prohibited grounds of 
discrimination the following: age, pregnancy, political opinion, trade union 
involvement, employment status, family status, identity of partner or 
relative, health status and sexual orientation. This bill remains before the 
Justice and Law Reform Select Committee. However, the Minister of 
Justice has announced2 that the Amendment Bill is to be superseded by a 
bill which consolidates the Race Relations Act 1971 and the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977. This paper argues that the inclusion of sexual 
orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination in an anti-discrimination 
statute like the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 is important and 
necessary. If the current Amendment Act is to be abandoned any 
replacement ought to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination. 3 
The process described above needs to be seen in the wider context of a 
description of the law as it relates to gays. This paper therefore describes 
the development of New Zealand law in this area, as well as possible future 
developments. It puts the New Zealand developments in context by 
comparing them with changes that have occurred in other similar 
* Edmund \1/hite, The Beawiful Room is Empty, 183. The passage is taken from a 
description of the Stonewall riots in New York on 28 June 1969, around the time Judy 
Garland died. 
1 The Act decriminalised sodomy and indecency between men. Sodomy includes man 
to man sex, sex between men and women, and arguably some woman to woman sexual 
behaviour. 
2 Press Release dated 31 May 1991. 
3 The other grounds in the Amendment Act may also be important. Health Status is also 
important from a gay perspective because of the current HIV/AIDS crisis and its 
disproportionate impact on the gay community in New Zealand . 
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jurisdictions. And, it places the law in its theoretical context. 
The theoretical part of the discussion will be based on the work of Michel 
Foucault, a French philosopher and historian. The work of Foucault has 
been very influential in for scholars working in various disciplines 
concerned with the study of society. The impact of his thinking is also 
beginning to be felt in the discipline of the law.4 Though he himself would 
eschew all labels, his work is clearly influenced by Marxism and by 
Nietzsche's theories about knowledge.5 In addition to its philosophical 
antecedents, Foucault's method relies heavily on writing histories so can 
therefore also been seen as part of the tradition of writing "histor~ 
below" - that is histories of social organisation and the concerns of ordinary 
people (as opposed to political history - the history of the concerns of the 
powerful elite) - though he is also writing intellectual history. 
Foucault's last work was a multi-volume history of sexuality.6 In this work 
he investigates how societies understand and deal with issues concerning sex 
and sexuality, how knowledge about sex and sexuality is formed in 
societies, what impact this knowledge has on the society. This work has a 
number of important insights about man-to-man sex, homosexuality and 
gays throughout history and will be the major theoretical basis of this paper. 
In discussing the relationship between gays and the law parallels with 
arguments made by feminist theorists will be important. The concept in 
common is sexuality. As a leading feminist theorist, Catherine MacKinnon 
has said: "Sexuality is to feminism what work is to Marxism: that which 
is most one's own, yet most taken away. "1 Sexuality is obviously of vital 
interest to gay theorists. Gays are a minority which is formed on the basis 
of and defined by sexuality - gay theorists are faced with describing the 
consequences of this definition for gays and for society. 
4 See Rubenfeld "The Right to Privacy" (1989) 102 Harv LR 737, discussed extensively 
below n 46 and accompanying text. 
5 Turkel, Michel Foucault: Law, Power and Knowledge (1990) 17 J Law & Soc 170, 
170 - 172. This article contains a useful summary of Foucault's work, and sets it in context 
well. 
6 Foucault, T7ie Histo,y of Sexuality: Volume I, An Introduction (1976) Volume II, T7ie 
Use of Pleasure (1984) Volume III, The Care of the Se!f(1984) [hereafter Foucault I, II & 
Ill]. There was also to be a fourth volume on the sins of the flesh, and early christian 
theories of sex and desire but Foucault died before completing it. 
7 MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Addenda for Theory" 
(1982) 7 Signs 515. 
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In many ways the concerns of feminists and gay theorists are interlinked 
and similar, and the obvious parallels will be drawn in the course of this 
paper. However, it should be made clear that this paper is not an attempt 
to address the similarities and differences between feminism and gay theory 
or the similarity and difference between gays and feminists as political 
groups. That is an important and interesting topic, but complex and large, 
and beyond the scope of this paper. For this reason (among others) this 
paper does not directly address lesbian issues - except where this is made 
explicit. The concerns of lesbians are seen in the context of feminism, not 
in gay theory. 
The link that this paper is concerned with is the link between legal theory 
and legal thought and gay theory. There has been a momentous growth in 
gay theoretical writings in recent times. This writing builds on the gay and 
lesbian histories which have appeared,8 and the gay and lesbian literatures. 
9 
Even the discipline of the law is beginning to see writings from gay and 
lesbian perspectives .10 
The purpose of the paper should be made clear from the outset. This paper 
assumes some basic values which will not be justified: 
• That it is proper and desirable th at gays should be able to 
participate in society fully on terms which do not deny our 
sexuality. 
• That gays have the right to personal dignity. 
• That gays and others should be free to express themselves 
sexually . 
This paper does not seek, therefore, to provide an apologia for gay and 
lesbian existence. It does not ask why should the law further the aims set 
8 See Duberman, Vinicus and Chauncey, Hidden From History: Reclaiming the Gay 
and Lesbian Past (Penguin, London, 1991) for examples of gay and lesbian histories. The 
book's "Introduction" contains a brief history of the gay and lesbian history writing . 
9 Gay authors include David Leavitt, Edmund White, Adam Mars-Jones . 
10 "Symposium on Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues" (1991) 16 Queen's LJ 231 especially 
the interesting insights offered in Lahey, "Introduction" . 
? 
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out above. Othe have done this effectively.
11 Rather it asks how can 
sexuality be made more free, and how can gays be more free. This paper 
describe the techniques of the law as it deals with sex between men and 
gays in everyday existence. 
The paper is in two parts. The first part describes the work of Foucault 
and places it in the context of gay theory. The second part describes 
statutory law which has existed in New Zealand, Australia, Britain and the 
United States placing it in the context of the theory and arguing the 
importance and usefulness of law like the Human Rights Commission 
Amendment Bill for New Zealand. 
PART ONE: THEORY 
Foucault and the social construction of sexuality 
Foucault argues that sexuality is a comparatively recent phenomenon. 
Sexuality, he explains , is the concept used by modern western societies to 
describe and explain the preferences and tastes of individuals for sexual 
pleasure. An individual's sexuality is, according to Foucault, thought of as 
being more than mere behaviour, rather it is inherent in an individual and 
part of that individuals identity. The sex of a person's sexual partner(s) (a 
person's sexual object) is thought to be especially important in describing 
the sexuality of a person. Therefore, there are homosexuals, and 
heterosexuals. 12 
Other societies and western societies in the past, however, have not thought 
about sex in terms of sexuality and have not always considered sexual 
object to be important. Sexual activity in Greece, as Foucault explains, was 
a matter of personal ascetic. It did not matter how a man (for the authors 
of the time spoke from an exclusively male perspective) sought sexual 
pleasure and whether he choose to have sex with a woman or a boy. The 
11 Mohr, Gays/Juslice a S11uiy of E1hics, Sociely and Law (Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1988); Wolfson, "Civil Rights, Human Rights, Gay Rights : Minorities and the 
Humanity of the Different" (1991) 14 Harv J Law & Public Policy 21. See also the insights 
provided by gay literature especially: E M Forster Maurice (written in 1914 but not 
published until after the authors death in 1970 Christopher Isherwood Christopher and his 
Kind (1977). / 
12 Foucault I, 53 - 73, 103 - 114. 
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concern was whether he was ruled by his desires or whether he was 
properly in control and behaving with moderation. Indeed, moderation was 
the primary value in matters of pleasure, desire and sex. Leading a life of 
balance and moderation was considered to be the most important problem 
of existence, and regimen were devised to aid the individual in devising his 
own ascetic of care for the self. 13 
This Greco-Roman focus on the self and the individual can be contrasted 
with the prevailing intellectual attitudes of early Christians as Foucault 
describes them. Sexual activity was highly codified by the christians. A 
list of permissible and impermissible acts was compiled. Sin was the 
central concept and the problem of sex and desire was dealt with as a 
problem of the sins of the flesh.
14 Saint Augustine characterised all sexual 
activity for pleasure as sinful, and emphasised that only procreation was the 
proper purpose of sex - and that should be confined to the marriage 
relationship. 15 
The modern way of viewing sex differs markedly from both of the above 
modes. Sexuality is conceived of as being innate to the individual, 
immutable, important, and real. Where other cultures both present and 
historical conceive sexual behaviour as transitory and mutable, modern 
western society has reified sexual behaviour as an identity . 
This reification of sexuality been deployed so as to allow, according to 
Foucault, the creation of a number of important identities.
16 One of these 
is the homosexual. 
Foucault argues that the construction of sexuality in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries depended on a scientific technique. Experts, especially 
psychologists, psychiatrists and doctors discovered truths about sexuality 
and took on the task of defining what sexualities existed and who fell into 
what category. The primary technique for finding the truth was a technique 
adapted from Christianity -the confession. Psychoanalysis forced patients 
to speak about sex, allowing doctor and experts to interpret those 
13 Foucault II, especially Part One. 
14 Foucault I, 36 - 39. 
15 Kahn, "The Hermeneutics of Sexual Order" (1990) 31 Santa Clara LR 47. 
16 Foucault I p 104: listing the hysterical woman, the onanistic child, the procreative 
couple, and the perverse adult - one kind of which is the homosexual. 
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"confessions" and define their social significance. 17 A man confessing 
consuming desire for another man would be categorised as homosexual by 
these scientists (whereas the Greeks would have been concerned for his lack 
of personal control). This process also allowed the experts to correct 
perceived abnormalities, to treat the individual and have her or him 
conforming to society again. 
Indeed, for Foucault there is a continuity from the Victorian era to our own 
era characterised, not by the repression of speech about sex, but by the 
proliferation of discourse about sex and sexuality. The scientific discourses 
about sex that emerged, the medicalisation of sexuality, and the rise of 
psychoanalysis all represent aspects of this proliferation . Foucault disputes 
the "Freudian" hypothesis that sex was hidden and repressed in the 
Victorian era and only now can speak. Rather he argues that speech about 
sex was enforced then and now, and this forced confession allows the 
positive moulding of sex into sexuality, this process constituting an 
oppressive force in society. Real freedom is not to be sought by allowing 
sex to speak - because that was already mandatory. Sex is made free by 
allowing sex to be silent. 18 
To summarise, Foucault argues first that sexuality is not universal but is a 
social constructed knowledge. And, second, that the construction of 
sexuality forces individuals, not to be silent about their sexual desires but 
to confess them - and in the process have their own individual experience 
of sex redefined in expert terms. Both these arguments will be returned to 
later in the paper. 
It will not come as a surprise, given that modern western thinking is 
inculcated with the concept of sexuality, that the first of these arguments is 
not uncontroversial. Boswell,19 a gay theorist and historian, has describes 
17 Foucault I, 65 - 69. 
18 Foucault I, 17 - 49, 159 . 
19 Boswell, "Revolutions, Universals and Sexual Categories" in Duberman et al, above 
n 8, at 17 ff. Typical examples of writing on the "essentialist" side of the debate is Boswell 
himself in the cited article and in Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980) and possibly Mohr, Gays/Justice above n 11; 
and on the social constructionist side are Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in 
Britain from the Nineteenth Century to the Present (Quartet Books, London, 1977) and 
Padgug "Sexual Matters: Rethinking Sexuality in History" in Duberman et al, above n 8. 
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the controversy as a debate between the essentialistsw and the social 
constructionists. Boswell links this debate to the wider philosophical debate 
which has gone on for centuries and does not look likely to be fully 
resolved, between the realists, who believe in the real existence of things, 
and the nominalists, who believe only in the existence of names. 
In these terms the "debate" can be summarised in terms of views about the 
nature of homosexuality and being gay. There are basically two contrasting 
views - with variations possible within ·them. 
1 Behavioural option. The social constructionists believe that 
homosexuality or any sexuality is just one behavioural option 
chosen by the individual from a menu of options. At its 
strongest this view holds that people are inherently sexually 
polymorphous with the capacity, and under the right 
circumstances the inclination, to indulge in a range of sexual 
behaviours in terms of sexual object and sexual practice. 
The society and the culture in which they find themselves 
may (or may not) attempt to influence those choices - and 
this affects the range of (culturally) possible behaviours 
available. 
A weaker version of social constructionism might hold that 
individuals can and do have inherent sexual preferences for 
sexual objects and sexual practices, but society sees these 
preference though categories created by the prevailing 
knowledge. Thus a society that saw individuals sexuality as 
being mutable and polymorphous would not notice sexual 
preferences, and a society that saw sexuality as fixed would 
not notice variable preferences. 
2 Identity. The realist/essentialist position is that individuals 
have a sexual identity. It can be fixed according to object 
choice or perhaps according to practice. A possible 
taxonomy is homosexual-bisexual-heterosexual, but there may 
be others. This view holds that sexuality is innate, and that 
being gay, in particular, is an innate and important part of 
20 Boswell, ibid, 35, notes that no gay theorist would label themselves as an essentialist -
it has connotations of the arguments about the "naturalness" of behaviour. Rather the term 
is applied to someone as part of an argument against their work. As used here the term 
merely connote a position at one extreme of the argument, it is not used pejoratively. 
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a person's identity. 
Again a weaker version is possible. It is arguable that the 
preferences of an individual are real and fixed and that in 
studying different societies universals can be found, but that 
through time societies have described individual's sexuality 
according to different systems and categories. Thus men 
have existed in all societies who have preferred man-to-man 
sex but definitions of such men have changed from society 
to society and so has the level of repression of the lives of 
such men. 
In relation to this debate Foucault's position is not clear. He is concerned 
primarily with the creation, destruction and deployment of knowledge about 
sex and desire - not the creation and destruction of physical practices and 
groups in society. He does not deny the existence as to sexual object, and 
he does not deny that there have always been people who prefer to have sex 
with people of the other sex as well as people who prefer to have sex with 
their own sex. 21 Moreover, argues that the knowledge modern society has 
constructed about sexuality is powerful and consequently real. 
This paper takes the view that society has been successful in imbuing 
sexuality and homosexuality with reality. In our society there are 
homosexuals. The paper also takes the view that sexuality is not the only 
possible way of categorising the desire for sex in individuals, and that 
sexuality is a socially constructed phenomenon. As for the underlying 
reality of the situation in a universal (almost biological) sense, this paper 
does not take any view. It is the meaning and social implications of sex 
and sexuality that is important. 
Power, knowledge, and the law 
So far this paper has described Foucault's arguments about sex and 
sexuality. Some general points about his philosophy of power, knowledge 
and law need to be made before moving on. 
Power 
21 Foucault II, 190. 
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Power is a central concept for Foucault, being the fundamental force 
holding societies together. Three fundamental attributes of power as he 
describes it may be enumerated: power is local, it is productive and it is 
positive. 
Power is local 
Foucault does not believe that power can be accounted for by structures in 
society. He argues that power is sourced in local relationships - like doctor 
and patient, priest and penitent, parent and child. Each relationship has 
inherent in it disequilibria and inequality. These inequalities built up from 
below to form "the basis for wide-ranging effect of cleavage which run 
through the social body as a whole". 22 
Foucault describes the role of doctor, psychologists and educators in the 
construction and deployment of sexuality .23 Each relationship is important 
and may have different effects and inequalities . Nevertheless there are links 
between the deployments formed by the knowledge which underlies and 
informs the exercise of power.~4 
Power is productive 
Power is productive because it forms knowledge. 
25 Each of the 
relationships in which power is exercised generates knowledge about itself. 
Power and the exercise of power is justified by this knowledge which is 
formed within the power relationship. Psychologists, doctors and educators 
develop knowledge about sexuality according to which the concept of 
sexuality as a fundamental and important personality-affecting matter 
justifies the intervention of psychologists and others into the realm of sex. 
The concept of sexuality constitutes people with "abnormal" or "deviant" 
sexualities as "patients". Thus, power produces knowledge which can then 
be deployed. 
22 Foucault I, 94, 98. 
23 Foucault I, 103 - 114. 
24 Foucault I, 94 - 96. 
25 Foucault I, 81 - 114 especially 98. 
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Power is positive 
Power positively moulds lives. Foucault argues that power should not be 
thought about as negative commands in the form "thou shalt not" - power 
should not be thought of as Jaw. 26 Rather it should be thought of as 
positive techniques for creating and moulding lives. When power as 
sexuality is deployed on children for example, those exercising the power 
are concerned that they grow up to be normal healthy adults and tries to 
mould their attitudes and existence around this aim. 
When sexuality is deployed as homosexuality the aim is to mould 
heterosexual, productive, procreative existences. The existence of sexuality 
implies that a person must be either homosexual or heterosexual; and that 
heterosexuality is the norm. This in turn implies that a person who feels 
desire to have sex with someone of their own sex is forced either to deny 
that desire and retain their definition of themselves as heterosexual and 
normal; or to act on the desire and completely and irrevocably define 
themselves as homosexual and deviant. The first choice is the preferred 
• 07 
option.-
Law and power 
Foucault rejects the primacy of law as power because he sees law as a set 
of negative interdictions rather than positive encouragements.28 
In this paper, however, the aim is to analyse law in Foucault's terms. Law 
can be considered as a power locus - a locus in which knowledge can be 
generated and power can be deployed. In doing this it needs to be borne 
in mind first that law is not the single, or even the main, source of 
knowledge about sex and sexuality (though this seems a fairly obvious 
point). Therefore the knowledge underlying the law needs to be put in the 
context of knowledge generated by other disciplines. Secondly, power is 
characterised by its positive and productive nature. Therefore the negative 
commands of the law are of secondary importance to the underlying 
knowledge it reflects and positive effects it encourages. The concern of this 
26 Foucault I, 81 - 114, especially 82. 
27 See Dworkin below n 52 and accompanying text. 
28 Foucault I, 81 - 114 especially 82. 
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paper then is with law as policy, not law as rules. The provisions of the 
law form a system of knowledge and policy. Policy underlying one area of 
the law can be transmitted to other areas of the law and applied. In the 
same way, knowledge formed by the law can be transmitted to areas outside 
the law. 
In this way a sodomy statute which is interpreted as a condemnation of 
homosexuals can influence a Family Court Judge not to award child access 
rights to a gay man. And the notion that homosexuality is in some sense 
illegal (as well as or instead of immoral) may influence an employer not to 
employ a gay man. The policy of the law is therefore very important. 
The primary question posed as this paper reviews the statutory law affecting 
gays will therefore be: 
• What knowledge about sex and sexuality does the law 
reflect? 
• How does this knowledge interrelate with knowledge and 
power from other sources? 
• What impact does law and power have on gay men? 
• How could the law reflect the concerns for participation, 
dignity, and freedom of sexual expression out! ined in the 
introduction? 
PART TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 
Part two of this paper is a survey of the development of the law as it relates 
to man-to-man sex and to gays. The survey will cover law in Australia, 
Britain, the United States as well as New Zealand. As a broad proposition 
the law has moved from sodomy statutes, which among other things 
criminalise forms of man-to-man sex, to reform of the sodomy statutes 
decriminalising man-to-man sex (called in New Zealand Homosexual Law 
Reform), to anti-discrimination human rights legislation providing remedies 
LAW LIBRARY 
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for gays who are discriminated against.29 The movement is from a negative 
condemnatory legal view of gays, to a positive and affirming view. It is 
the argument of this paper that this movement can be seen as a single 
process, within the context of the law as it relates to gays as well as the 
way society views gays. 
Sodomy Statutes 
In many common law and other countries there have at various times been 
statutes which forbid sodomy. Though these statutes are characteristically 
thought of as having as their object the regulation of sexual activity between 
men, in fact they are normally expressed to encompass a much wider range 
of behaviour. Sodomy can be committed between men and men, women 
and men, and women and women - indeed exactly what behaviour constitute 
sodomy is not clear. Under differing definitions it may be confined to anal 
sex, or it may include oral sex - fellatio or cunnilingus - and it may even 
extend to vaginal sex in an "immoral" position. 
The statutes therefore regulate both same-sex and different-sex sexual 
activity covering a range of behaviour. The earliest of the common law 
statutes in the secular sphere is recorded in Coke's Institutes. Buggery was 
statutorily banned during the reign of Henry VIII,by the statute 25 Henry 
8 c 6, though it was an offence at common law too. 30 In New Zealand 
prior to 1986 the Crimes Act prohibited sodomy, which seems to have been 
anal penetrative sex and could be committed homosexually and 
heterosexually; and it prohibited indecency between men, which covers 
other man-to-man sexual behaviour. Both these provisions covered 
consensual sexual activity. Consensual sexual activity between women was 
not prohibited. The New Zealand pattern also appears in England
31 and the 
Australian jurisdictions32• 
In the United States the statutes are more varied. In Georgia sodomy is 
29 This process is normally seen in this order eg NSW, however there are counter 
examples, Wisconsin had anti-discrimination legislation a year before reform of sodomy 
Jaws, and the District of Columbia has anti-discrimination legislation but retain criminal 
penalties for sodomy. 
30 Halsbury's Laws of England vol 11 para 1027. 
31 Sexual Offences Act 1956. 
32 For example, ss 208 - 211 Queensland Criminal Code - now reformed see below n 
37. 
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defined as any "sexual act involving the sex organs of one of one person 
and the mouth or anus of another" .33 Alabama prohibits similar acts but 
confines the prohibitions to non-married people. 34 
As noted above on their face the sodomy statutes regulate heterosexual 
conduct as well as homosexual and they date from relatively early times. 
In Foucault's scheme these statutes therefore relate to a period before the 
discovery of sexuality and the creation of the homosexual.35 They are 
premised on a knowledge about sex the supposes that everyone may at 
various times desire sex with someone of their own sex. They attempt to 
regulate the sexual behaviour of all people. Pre-eighteenth century 
everyone was seen as having the capacity, if not the urge, to commit 
sodomy, sodomy was not confined to a certain group. Moreover, sexual 
object is not seen as of primary importance, sexual practice is. The statutes 
therefore are facially neutral between same-sex activity and different-sex 
activity. 
These statutes can therefore be seen as a legacy of an older tradition which 
is pre-sexuality. Although it is customary to relate these statutes solely or 
principally to homosexuality, so that they have come to be seen as being 
inextricably linked to the outlawing of homosexuals , on their face they are 
not confined to this group. The law is written on the assumption that 
sodomy is possible for anyone. Knowledge about homosexuals and 
homosexuality was created in other disciplines. This knowledge is 
superimposed upon the law and subverts the idea that sodomy is a 
behavioural option open to anyone. The knowledge is imported into the 
law and cast the sodomy statutes in an entirely new light. Whereas before 
the statutes regulated behaviour, now they regulate a group of people.36 
The knowledge underlying the sodomy statute has therefore changed over 
time, so too has their nature and purpose in the legislative scheme. 
The sodomy statutes are expressed in the form of negative commands 
regulating behaviour. This is unsurprising since they are part of the 
33 Goldstein, "History, Homosexuality and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden 
Determinants of Bowers v Hardwick" (1988) 97 Yale LJ 1073, note l. 
34 "Developments: Sexual Orientation and the Law" (1989) 102 Harv LR 1508, 1532 
note 91. 
35 Foucault I, 43; Padgug above n 19, 41. 
36 Foucault I, 43; and see Dworkin below n 52 and accompanying text. 
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criminal law which is almost always expressed in this form. In Foucault's 
argument though power is seen not as negative commands but positive and 
productive policy formation. The sodomy statutes on their face do not deal 
in policy at all. However, the sodomy statutes are for the most part almost 
universally not enforced. 37 They do not therefore function as criminal law 
at all, except in so far as they regulate non-consensual activity (that is forms 
of man-to-man rape). Thus they are subverted in their purpose. The 
identification of the sodomy statutes with homosexuality allows them to 
become powerful expressions of legislative disapproval of homosexuality. 
In Bowers v Hardwick:8 this was in fact argued to be the major purpose of 
the statutes. In this way legislative commands in a negative form have 
become, in the context of prevailing views about sexuality and 
homosexuality, positive encouragement to be heterosexual.39 
The final point to make about the statutes relates to the kind of law they 
are. They are criminal law regulating the relationship between the state and 
individuals . They represent therefore the idea that sexuality can be the 
subject of legitimate public interest. In that they relate to consensual 
behaviour, they expose the morality of sex to the public gaze. Thus 
homosexuality can be discussed as a public problem in which people have 
views. When reform of the laws is contemplated the issue becomes fraught 
with petitions and calls for referenda. Homosexuality, where there are 
sodomy statutes is a matter of public law. 
I 
The next stage - Refonn 
From the late sixties on many common law jurisdiction have reformed their 
sodomy laws to decriminalise homosexual sex (as well as the heterosexual 
37 The American case that most recently came close was Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 
186 (1986) . In that case the police visited Michael Hardwick's house for reason's unrelated 
to his sexuality, but happenyd to see him and his lover in bed together. The police arrested 
them both but later releascythem without charge. No prosecution was ever laid - Michael 
Hardwick used the arrest as the basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
sodomy statute in Georgia. The one exception to non-enforcement in recent times is 
Queensland which has since reformed is law as one of the results of the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
and its aftermath. -
38 478 US 186 (1986). A United States case deciding the constitutionality of a sodomy 
statute. 
39 See Rubenfeld "The Right of Privacy" (1989) 102 Harv LR 737, 799-801; below n 
46 and accompanying text. 
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aspects of the statutes as well). 40 There are a number a ways they have 
done this. But in general they fall between two extremes. Some 
jurisdictions have decriminalised but attempt to retain a negative view of 
homosexuality and gays in their statutes, and some attempt to remove from 
their statutory law any view of the value or otherwise of homosexuality and 
gays. And, within that continuum there is a further refinement between 
those jurisdictions that provide specific defences and those that simply 
decriminalise. 
Refomi with negative policy statements 
Western Australia 
Western Australia decriminalised in 1989 with the Western Australia Law 
Reform (Decriminalisation of Sodomy) Act. The Act has three salient 
features. 
First, it has a preamble which sets out a statement of the policy th at the 
legislature had in mind in enacting the legislation : 
WHEREAS, the Parliament does not believe that sexual acts 
between consenting adults in private ought to be regulated by 
the Criminal Law; 
AND WHEREAS, the parliament disapproves of sexual 
relations between people of the same sex; 
AND WHEREAS, the parliament disapproves of the 
promotion or encouragement of homosexual behaviour; 
AND WHEREAS, the parliament does not by its action, 111 
removing any criminal penalty for sexual acts in private 
between persons of the same sex, wish to create a change of 
community attitude to homosexual behaviour; 
AND WHEREAS, in particular the Parliament disapproves 
40 Great Britain in 1967, Canada in 1969, California in 1975, New Zealand in 1986, 
New South Wales in 1984, Western Australia in 1989, South Australia in 1976, Victoria 
in 1980, Northern Territory in 1983, Australian Capital territory in 1985, Queensland in 
1990; Tasmania however failed to pass a law reform bill in 1991. 
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of persons with the care, supervision or authority over young 
persons urging them to adopt homosexuality as a life-style 
and disapproves of the instrumentalities of the state so doing: 
be it therefore enacted ... 
The second feature echoes the first. In section 23 of the Act it is declared 
that: 
It shall be contrary to public policy to encourage or promote 
homosexual behaviour and the encouragement of homosexual ( 
behaviour shall not be capable of being a pub~se. ~,,,...,-
Similarly section 24: 
It is unlawful to promote or encourage homosexual behaviour 
as part of the teaching in any primary or secondary 
educational institution. 
The final feature is the provision of special ages of consent to have same-
sex sex (female 18; male 21), and to the provision of a special offence of 
having homosexual sex in public or procuring such sex in public .4 1 
This Act represents the most comprehensive attempt to decriminalise sex 
between men and yet make clear legislative statements and create coherent 
public policy which condemns homosexuality. It attempts to confined 
homosexuality entirely to a private sphere. No longer can the law interfere 
in private consensual sex, but on the other hand the law cannot support gays __ -:...; __ _ 
or gay relationships, in particular the young must be insulated from 
knowledge about (positive) aspects of being gay. This act is profoundly 
problematic and has been criticised by gay groups, wondering if it is any 
advance on the previous law. 42 
41 In the context of this statute there is an interpretation problem with respect to 
procuring sex in public . It is unclear whether it is an offence to do the procuring in public, 
or whether the sex (which is procured) has to be in public. 
42 Pink Triangle, issue 82, March/April 1990, p 20. 
I) -
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Britain 
The British legislation has similar messages to the Western Australian Act 
but is a less coherent statement. England decriminalised homosexuality in 
1967 in the Sexual Offences Act 1967. The scheme of this Act is to 
provide a series of defences available to a man who is accused of buggery 
or indecency between men under ss 12 and 13 of the Sexual Offences Act 
1956. Under the 1967 Act, a homosexual act committed between adults in 
private is not subject to criminal sanction. Adult is defined as over twenty-
one. Sex is deemed not to be private if it is performed in a public lavatory, 
or where there are more than two people present.43 And, the act does not 
apply to merchant ships (and the military which are covered by separate 
rules). However, the burden of proving that the act was otherwise than 
consensual adult and private is on the prosecution, no prosecution may be 
brought against any man for sex with another man where either were under 
twenty-one without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and 
no prosecution can be brought after twelve months for (consensual) 
indecency or buggery where no assault was involved and the parties were 
over sixteen. The Act also introduces distinctions between penetrator and 
penetrated, oral and anal sex, various ages and age differentials of the 
parties. 
The scheme of the legislation sets up a series of exceptions to something 
which is prime'facie criminal - namely buggery. The exceptions moreover 
do not take in all of the adult consensual sexual encounters a man might 
have with another man - because of the exceedingly narrow definitions of 
I adult and private. Twenty-one is a very high age of consent which does not apply to either heterosexual or lesbian sex. 44 In addition, in England there 
have been repeated problems with overzealous policing of public 
I avatories. 45 
The legislative scheme is further complicated by the recent enactment of 
section 2A of the Local Government Act 1986 (as inserted by the Local 
Government Act 1988 s 28). This provision ~ declares that: 
43 One wonders if this is to be taken as moral condemnation of multi-person sex, or just 
indicative of a profound lack of imagination. 
44 See Helfer, "Finding a Consensus on Equality : The Homosexual Age of Consent 
and the European Convention on Human Rights" (1990) 65 NYULR 1044. 
45 Jenkins, "Privates on Parade" New Statesman Society 9 November 1990, p 10. 
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(1) A local authority shall not -
(a) intentional! ypromote homosexuality or pub! ish 
material with the intention of promoting 
homosexuality; 
(b) promote the teaching in any maintained school 
of the acceptability of homosexuality as a 
pretended family relationship. 
This section has a similar intent to the Western Australian statements of 
policy, though the scope may be more limited. The effect is to impede 
local authorities from providing funds to gay and lesbian groups or 
opportunities for gays and lesbians to have a public presence. It also 
intends to keep gays and lesbians out of the education system. Though the 
statements are more specifically targeted than the Western Australian 
provisions the intent is nevertheless just as clear - to force gays and 
lesbians into invisibility and confine gay and lesbian lives to a private 
sphere. 
In these two jurisdictions an attempt has been made to remove the state 
from the regulation of consensual sex by removing the sanctions of the 
criminal law applying to man-to-man sex. However, there is also an 
attempt to prevent the state from supporting gays in any way. The 
statutory law makes it clear that homosexuals are not to be viewed by the 
law in anything other than a negative light. It is forbidden to promote 
homosexuality. The legislation attempts to enforce silence on gays. Under 
these schemes gays can have sex, but are discouraged from leading public 
lives as gays. In this way the legislation which makes homosexuality a 
private matter, is just as repressive as the previous law which brought 
homosexuality into the public sphere. 
Reform: Neutral Statutes 
Australian Capital Territory 
In contrast to legislation with removes statutory punishment for same-sex 
sex but seeks to keep the concept there is legislation which seeks to remove 
the distinction between same-sex and different-sex sex. The best example 
for this is the Australian Capital Territory's Crimes (Amendment) 
Ordinance (No 5) 1985. This ordinance overhauls the law as it relates to 
sexual offences in the ACT. It creates a scheme of degrees of sexual 
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assault and indecency, which revolves primarily around a concept of 
sexual intercourse with violence or without consent. Sexual intercourse is 
defined to include penetration of the vagina or anus of any person with a 
part of the body of another, or penetration with any object; insertion of the 
penis into a persons mouth; or cunnilingus. The term includes the 
"standard" varieties of sex of all kinds of sexualities and the Ordinance 
does not seek to differentiate between them at all in its scheme. In this 
way the criminal law is completely neutral as between different types of 
sex and does not seek to regulate any consensual adult sex. The age of 
consent to all sex is 16. 
California 
California also has sexual offences legislation which does not differentiate 
between same-sex and different-sex activity though in a different form. 
§ 286 of the California Penal code criminalises acts of Sodomy which is 
defined as non-consensual non-adult penis-anus sex, but is not defined by 
the sex of the penetrated party. Oral sex is also criminalised under § 288, 
and included non-adult, non-consensual oral sex of any kind fellatio or 
cunnilingus. 
New 7.ealand 
The legislation of New Zealand since the Homosexual Law Reform Act 
1986 and the Crimes Amendment Act 1985 (which revamped the sexual 
offences parts of the Crimes Act) is partly neutral as to sexual object 
choice. Sexual violation is now the most serious crime and it incorporates 
a man who rapes a woman, as well as any person who penetrates the 
vagina or anus of another with a part of there body or with any object. 
Thus sexual violation can be committed by both men and women on men 
and women. However, the lessor offences of sexual assault and the offence 
involving sex with under age people are still defined with reference to the 
sex of the actors. Nevertheless, although the offences of sex with under 
age people do draw a distinction between man-woman sex, woman-woman-
sex and man-man sex in that there is no age of consent for a man to have 
sex with a woman, otherwise the age for consenting to sex for all people is 
sixteen. New Zealand is therefore mixed in its approach to reform -
though this is probably explained by the fact that reform was a single piece 
of legislation aimed at reforming the sodomy Jaws rather then a wholesale 
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reform of all sexual offences law (as for instance the ACT reform was). 
Neutral Statutes: Evaluation 
The neutral statutes effectively remove the criminal law from the 
regulation of consensual sexual activity and they do not attempt to replace 
it with legislative statements of public policy about the status of gays. 
Thus gay sex is taken out of the public sphere and considered a private 
matter without any attempt by the law to enforce gay silence. 
In this kind of a regime the criminal law expresses no policy about the 
nature of consensual sexual activity and no view about gays and lesbians. 
If this is coupled with no other statutory statements then the (statutory) law 
can be considered neutral between sexual activity and can be considered not 
to know about sexuality as it has been constructed by society. 
Rubenfeld46 contends, using arguments he bases on Foucault's work, that 
this statutory silence on the subject of sodomy, homosexuality and gays is 
the best state for the law to be in. Rubenfeld's argument is made in the 
context of United States' constitutional law and suggests a unifying analysis 
of the line of privacy cases. 47 His analysis then is directed to a different 
objective that of to this paper, 48 but is apposite because of the uses it 
suggests for Foucault's argument and the limitation the arguments, as 
deployed by Rubenfeld , have for the scope of the law relating to gays. 
His major argument is based on Foucault's notion of the positive nature of 
power. Power in general and law as a specific kind of power, is 
characterised by its productive force. 
In Foucault's conception, the significance of the law does not 
reside in the interdiction itself, but in the extent to which the 
law interjects us in a network of norms and practices that 
46 Rubenfeld, '"The Right of Privacy'" (1989) 102 Harv LR 737. 
47 His analysis covers a wide range of cases unconnected with homosexuality . The 
privacy line of case in America include Griswold v Conneticutt 381 US 479 (1965) on the 
availability of contraception, Eisenstadt v Baird 405 US 438 (1972) also on contraception, 
Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973) on abortion, Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 (1986) on 
sodomy statutes. 
48 I would not want to suggest that Rubenfeld would not support anti-discrimination 
rights for gays. However on the arguments raised in his paper he would be forced to treat 
the question of anti-discrimination as entirely separate to the sodomy statutes. 
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affirmatively shape our lives. 49 
Keeping this point in mind, the danger posed by positive productive law is 
that it will take over a person's life completely, so that the force inherent 
in the law for normalisation will come to define an individual's existence. 
Rubenfeld argues that the law should not do this, and that the right to 
privacy prevents this. Rubenfeld calls this idea the principle of anti-
totalitarianism. The law should be prevented from 
taking over, or taking undue advantage of, those process by 
which individuals are defined in order to produce overly 
standard, functional citizens. 50 
He applies this principle to the sodomy statutes and to the case of Bowers 
v Hardwick. Sodomy statute he argues channel individual's sexual desire 
into reproductive outlets. They reinforce sex roles and they enforce 
heterosexuality in a positive way. 
In our time, the use of the heterosexual/homosexual axis has 
achieved a paramount normalising significance. The 
proscription is against homosexual sex; the products are lives 
forced into relations with the opposite sex that substantially 
direct individuals' roles in society and a large part of their 
everyday existence. 51 
Andrea Dworkin makes a similar point linking the indiction against sodomy 
with the dominance of men over women, illustrating the way that the 
sodomy statutes work to productively create heterosexual lives. 
The sodomy laws are important, perhaps essential, m 
maintaining for men a superiority of civil and sexual status 
over women. They protect men as a class from the violence 
of penetration; men's bodies have unbreachable 
boundaries.... The power of the gender system with men on 
top depends on keeping men distinct from women precisely 
49 Above n 46, 783 
50 Above n 46, 794. 
51 Above n 46, 800, note the use of opposite sex in this quote. This phrase itself implies 
a heterosexual view of the world . Questions may be posed: in what sense in one sex 
opposite to the other, where does one sex end and the other begin, 
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in this regard. In sodomy, men can be used as women are 
used; with real carnal pleasure for the one doing the fucking; 
and with real carnal pleasure for the one being fucked. 52 
Moreover, for Dworkin the sodomy laws prevent the feminisation of men -
and men who do have sex with men are constituted as a race apart. 
The act of sodomy is not the crime against nature; the men 
themselves are the crime against nature. The law is 
internalised, a curse a what they are, a ubiquitous and 
inescapable social stigma. 53 
Thus, the sodomy statutes can be said to affirmatively direct a the shape of 
a person's life by enforcing exclusive heterosexuality. Rubenfeld argues 
that law which interferes in an individuals life to this extent is totalitarian 
and goes beyond the proper scope of law .54 
Rubenfeld extends this argument and contends that the law should not try 
to reflect sexuality. He argues that the concept of sexuality itself is a 
construction which limits a person's freedom to choose their own forms of 
sexual expression. Any law, or any programme for reforming or changing 
the law which has as its base the concept of individual's having a defined 
sexuality is self-defeating. Sexuality itself is defined so as to limit and 
shape an individual's life. 
Thus Rubenfeld relies on two of Foucault's arguments: that power is 
positive and productive in its nature, and that sexuality is socially 
constructed and of itself repressive. His conclusion is that the law should 
not regulate man-to-man sex (a conclusion this paper would not disagree 
with). 
However, by relying on the right to privacy, and applying Foucault's 
argument in the way he does to deny the existence of sexuality, Rubenfeld 
would effectively consign gay lives to a private sphere of invisibility and 
perpetuate many of the problems gays face. The reasons for this are to be 
52 Dworkin, Intercourse (The Free Press, New York, 1987), 156 
53 Ibid, 155 [emphasis original]. 
54 Jn the context of United States law, Rubenfeld argues that such law is unconstitutional. 
In the New Zealand context, it is more appropriate to argue that parliament should reform 
the law than that the courts should. 
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found in Foucault as well.ss There are three. 
First, one of Foucault's major concerns was to displace the primacy of law 
in the analysis of power and knowledge. Power comes from many sources 
and is to be found and studied in specific relationships. The law is merely 
one source of power. Therefore, if the law becomes silent on the issue of 
homosexuality and sodomy, this does not solve the problems created by 
homosexuality as a social construct and the moral condemnation of 
homosexuals. Homosexuality emerged from medical and psychological 
analyses not legal analyses. The attempt remove the concepts of sexuality 
and homosexuality from the law by arguing the privacy of sex in a legal 
sense does not destroy the concepts. 
This argument is made by MacKinnon m respect of the case of Roe v 
Wade, a case in which the United States Supreme Court dealt with the 
constitutionality of a statute outlawing abortion. In that decision the court 
held that the right to privacy precludes state interdiction of abortion. 
MacKinnon argues that this does not reinforce a woman's right to choose 
how she expresses her sexuality. Rather it simply forces women's 
experience of sexuality into the private sphere where it has been and is 
defined and controlled by men. Thus legal privacy does not increase 
freedom. It simply makes women sexuality invisible. 
Similarly forcing gay sexuality into a sphere of privacy does not give more 
freedom, but it does prevent gays from having legally recognised concerns. 
This exactly what the Western Australian statute is aimed at in a more 
coherent way. 
Secondly, Rubenfeld's argument also fails to deal satisfactorily with the 
productive nature of power. The law as a source of power creates or 
reinforces, in the form of sodomy statutes prevailing knowledge/prejudice 
against homosexuals. Repealing the statue is a negative act. By repealing 
the statutes new knowledge about homosexuality is not necessarily created. 
It merely creates a void. In order for that void not to be filled by the 
familiar concept of homosexuality and the familiar prejudice there must be 
an alternative cast in positive terms. 
55 There may be evidence lo suggest that Foucault would have agreed with Rubenfeld's 
analysis (Bell "Beyond the 'Thorny Question ': Feminism, Foucault and the Dcsexualisation 
of Rape" (1991) 119 Intl J Sociology of Law 83) but this is unclear and I would argue 
inconsistent with his own arguments. 
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These two counter-arguments basically say that landlords and employers still 
know that homosexuals exist, whether sodomy laws are on the books or 
not, and can still discriminate if they so desire. The real power affecting 
gays adversely has always come not from the public law, but from private 
discrimination. Mere repeal of sodomy laws then is a small advance. 
Thirdly, though Foucault does argue for the social construction of sexuality 
he does not deny the reality or relevance to peoples lives of the knowledge 
so created. In fact quite the opposite. A major consequence of the 
deployment of power in the form of sexuality is the technique by which 
sexuality is applied by the individual to her or his own life. Individuals 
analyse their own lives in terms of sexuality . Thus sexuality is deployed by 
the self on the self. The concept of sexuality gets its strength from this 
process - mere change in the law will not affect they way people define 
themselves. Moreover the consequences of such a self-definition will 
continue to be felt. If the identity of homosexual continues to be seen in a 
negative light, homosexual people will continue to be confined to silence 
and self-denigration. 
This last argument overstates the effect negative effects of self-definition as 
a homosexual/gay. As argued above the law is not the only or even the 
main source of knowledge by which people define their lives. The gay 
community gives an alternative and positive view of the 1 ives of those 
homosexuals who define themselves as gay. Indeed, the concept of being 
gay itself is an attempt to provide a positive alternative to the medicalised 
concept of the homosexual. Gays are different from homosexuals precisely 
in who defines our lives. Gays are self-defined and the consequences and 
implications of being gay are defined by gays. Homosexuals are (as 
Foucault argues) self-defined - but the implications of being homosexual are 
settled by others . 
The concept off being gay does utilise the concept of sexuality. Being gay 
is an identity not a random set of behaviour. However, it is both positively 
valued, self-imposed and self-defined. It recognises the reality of sexuality 
in this society, but it also allows for freedom of sexual expression in that 
it does not presuppose a morality or personal ascetic imposed from outside 
oneself. Moreover, it provides a positive alternative to the concept of the 
homosexual, so there is no void left. And it allows for the proclamation of 
values and knowledge not based on outside concepts, but generated within 
the gay community. 
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It is the thesis of this paper that dignity, participation and freedom of sexual 
expression is facilitated by the creation and recognition of "the gay" as an 
identity in place of "the homosexual". 
It follows from the arguments above that being gay is not a matter to be 
confined to the arena of personal and private choice. Given the prevailing 
knowledge about sexuality, and the negative view of homosexuals which the 
creation of sexuality has allowed, public affirmation of the gay identity and 
of gay lives is necessary in order for gays not to be discriminated against 
in the most basic of ways. The law is one possible forum for the 
publicisation of gays. It is not enough for the law to say nothing about 
gays, or homosexuality. Unless the law positively affirms the interests of 
gays then it is participating in the injustice of discrimination, and 
contributing to the problems of gays. 
It cannot be said that if gays are discriminated against, albeit by private 
people acting in a private capacity, in employment, housing or the provision 
of goods and services that gays can fully and freely participate in society , 
or that gays are treated with dignity. If the sanctions of discrimination are 
applied it cannot be said that gays have sexual freedom. Neither is it an 
argument to say that men can have sex with men so long as they do it in 
private and do not advertise the fact. This effectively stops people from 
freely expressing sexuality . 
Human rights and discrimination 
The use of human rights anti-discrimination statutes is obvious beginning. 
By providing that sexual orientation cannot be used to base a decision 
relating to employment or provision of accommodation or goods and 
services, gives gays and lesbians a remedy if discriminated against and 
proclaims that gays and lesbians have the right to be treated as equal 
nongays and non-lesbians . 56 
These statutes normally set up a Commission or board which deals with 
complaints about discrimination on impermissible grounds, and may also 
have policy or educative functions. Impermissible grounds of 
56 I am not here concerned to deconstruct the use of the term "equal" and its implications 
for justice. I am simply concerned about power and lack of power, and strategies for 
empowering disadvantaged groups. 
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discrimination are traditionally at least sex, race and religion. Some 
jurisdictions have added sexual orientation, or a similar phrase to the list, 
including New South Wales and South Australia in Australia; and, in the 
United States, Wisconsin, Mass6chusetts, Conneticutt, Hawaii, the District 
of Columbia and many cities and counties (including New York city, San 
Francisco, and Chicago). 57 And, the Victorian Law Reform Commission 
recommended that sexuality be added to the list of prohibited ground under 
the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act. 58 
As was mentioned in the introduction there is at present before the 
Parliament of New Zealand the Human Rights Commission Amendment Bill 
which proposes to add "sexual orientation" to the list of prohibited grounds 
of discrimination under the New Zealand anti-discrimination/human rights 
legislation. The bill fJhin its present form is useful for gays and lesbians. 
Examining it more closely it provides (in conjunction with the principal 
Act, the Human Rights Commission Act 1977) protection against 
discrimination on in the area of employment and training, access to public 
places, provision of goods and services, housing and accommodation . 
It adds a number of prohibited grounds to the present Act's list.59 Relevant 
to this paper are the grounds sexual orientation and health status. Sexual 
orientation is defined as a homosexual , heterosexual or bisexual orientation, 
it expressly includes the condition of being transsexual , transvestite and 
hermaphroditic, and expressly excludes paedophilic orientations. Some 
problems with this definition exist in that paedophilia (whatever it means) 
is clearly considered dangerous and therefore the subject of valid 
discrimination. It is linked traditionally with arguments made by people 
who are anti-gay that gays molest children.00 It is problematic to have such 
an argument reflected in a statute designed to prevent discrimination against 
gays and anyway, the definition is clear without this express disclaimer. 
Apart from the definition there substantive provisions are good. There are 
only three permissible exceptions to a blanket rule of no discrimination on 
57 "Developments : Sexual orientation and the Law" (1989) 102 Harv LR 1508, 1667 
- 1668 nn 49 & 51; Cicchino, Deming & Nicholson "Sex, Lies and Civil Rights : A Critical 
History of the Massechusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill" (1991) 26 Harv Civil Rights - Civil 
Liberties LR 549,556 - 558 . 
58 Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Review of 1he Equal Opporlllnity Act (Report 
36, 1990), 24 - 26. 
59 cl 14F, 
60 See Criminal Justice Commission of Queensland , Reforms in the Law Relating to 
Homosexuality (1990), 6 - 12 for a discussion of the arguments. 
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the grounds of sexual orientation. They are: 
• In employment, 61 where the position requires a married 
couple (though this presumes that married couple exclude gay 
and lesbian couples) - this must surely be rare if an objective 
test of the requirement is imposed. 
• In employment, 62 if the job is domestic. This applies to all 
discrimination except racial and is unobjectionable. 
• in share residential accommodation, 63 again this seems 
unobjectionable. 
On the negative side, the scheme of the act means that the provision of gay-
and/or lesbian-only space - for example gay and lesbian coffee houses, or 
nightclubs - may be contrary to the Bill and this may not be desirable. It 
may be possible to bring these sorts of facilities under cl 29 which provides 
an exception for positive measures designed to promote equality for a 
disadvantaged group. 
On the subject of health status the act is also useful. AIDS has provoked 
an enormous amount of worry in New Zealand . There is a lot of 
disinformation about how it is caught and what it means to have Aids or to 
be HIV positive. HIV/AIDS has hit the gay community in this country 
disproportionately. Having health status as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination not only helps with the problem of discrimination against 
people with specific mental or physical disabilities, but also has a spin off 
effect for gays. 
The bill is drafted in neutral terms in that it would be illegal to discriminate 
against homosexual and heterosexual people. However, set against a 
background in which discrimination is most likely to happen against gays 
and lesbians, it provide gays and lesbians with a specific remedy if 
employment is denied on the basis of sexuality. This is a powerful 
legislative statement of approval of gays and lesbians lives. 
61 cl 15C. 
62 cl 15I. 
63 cl 25A. 
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The bill in providing such remedies allows gays and lesbians to be publicly 
visible by providing a weapon against any discrimination which might arise. 
Though the remedy is not perfect and may be difficult to apply in many 
cases, nevertheless it is there. This is especially important at the present 
time. The AIDS crisis threatens not just the public lives of gays but our 
physical lives as well. By providing increased opportunities for gays to 
participate in the public life of the community as gays, means that men 
who have sex with men are more susceptible to safe sex propaganda and 
therefore better informed about ways of self-protection, and have a higher 
self-esteem and are consequently less willing to take life-threatening risks. 64 
However, It should be recognised that the Amendment Bill provides only 
limited remedies in a narrow area. Massechusetts in passing a similar bill 
attached to its provisions policy statements like the statements found in the 
Western Australia Law Reform (Decriminalisation of Sodomy) Act though 
less strong. 65 It was seen as an attempt to provide minimum rights to gays -
to employment, housing etc - without providing full scale social recognition 
and approval. In this way courts in deciding issue involving gays and 
lesbians but not directly related to the anti-discrimination law may not be 
able or choose to taken account of the positive view of gays and lesbians 
that it embodies. 
Clearly the New Zealand bill has not taken this narrow view. But the 
provisions of the bill are limited to providing a narrow range of rights. In 
New Zealand it is open and highly desirable, to expand on the positive 
view of gays and lesbians implicit in the Amendment Act through 
legislation, administrative policy and common law. 
Developments 
Already in New Zealand immigration policy recognises long standing gay 
relationships (of two years or more) and allows partners of gay and lesbian 
New Zealanders residence. 66 Housing Corporation policy may recognise the 
64 National Council on AIDS (New Zealand), The New Zealand Strategy on HIV/AIDS 
(1990), 40 - 41. 
65 Cicchino, Deming & Nicholson "Sex, Lies and Civil: A Critical History of the 
Massechusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill" (1991) 26 Harv Civil Rights - Civil Liberties LR 549. 
66 Pink Triangle issue 74 November/December 1988 p 10. 
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special housing needs o/ gay and lesbian groups.67 
The recently circulated draft Censorship Bill also participates in this 
process. 68 It includes as a specific factor in making a censorship decision 
the fact that material 
treats as inherently unequal any particular class of persons, 
or members of the class,by reference to . .. sexual 
orientation ... (cl 28(5)(d)) 
Thus censorship decision-making has to be aware of the effect that material 
has on the dignity of gays and lesbians. In a regime governed by a clause 
such as clause 28 it would also be difficult for a censor to treat material 
which is aimed at gay and lesbian groups as subject to higher standards 
than other material. 
Children have always been a difficult area for gays and lesbians. It seems 
a key part of the agenda of people who are anti-gay to limit gays and 
lesbians access to children. Certainly many of the statutory statements of 
disapproval in the Western Australian Act are directed at children and 
education. The fear must be the if you get to them early enough you might 
"convert" them from right-thinking heterosexuality. The obvious counter-
argument to that is that if you get to the gay and lesbian children early 
enough with positive images and role models of gays and lesbians you 
prevent possible later self-abuse and self-hatred. 
Some gays and lesbians have children conceived by previous heterosexual 
relationships. 69 When these relationships have broken up and the gays and 
lesbians may have problems with custody and access. 70 Yv Y71 was looked 
upon as a landmark decision when it was made . It was the first time a 
67 Pink Triangle iss ue 75 January/February 1989 p 8. 
68 Minister of Justice, Censorship and Pornography: Proposals for Legislarion (1990) 
cl 28(5)( d). 
69 Some also have children while in gay and lesbian relationships - this is a different 
issue. 
70 See generally Bullerworth 's Family Law Service volume 2, 6028 - 6028/1, 6039; 
acknowledgment is made of an unpublished LLM seminar paper presented to the 1990 
Family Law seminar at Victoria University by Robb Newberry "Homophobia and the 
Welfare of the Child - a New Zealand Perspective". 
71 Noted at [1981) NZ Recent Law 302, properly B v B (High Court, Rotorua, 18 June 
1981, M145/80, Barker J) . 
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lesbian mother was awarded custody of her daughter. However the Judge 
in the case made commented to the effect that he would not approve if the 
mother fell under the influence of II aggressive lesbians 11 • In a more recent 
decision on access, 72 though the Judge made comments that homosexuality 
in itself was not relevant, a gay man was denied access to his children on 
the grounds that the mother and her new (male) partner could not cope with 
the father's being gay, and this was distressing the children. This is in 
conflict with the general position when the custodial parent is upset by non-
custodial parent access. 73 
It is argued that gays and lesbians in the family court are yet treated with 
full equality to non-gay and non-lesbian people. The proper remedy for this 
situation is the development of a common law which recognises that gays 
and lesbians do not have adverse affects on children, rather gay and lesbian 
parents have an important role in bringing up children. The development 
of human rights law may contribute to this process, because the courts can 
guide the common law by reference to legislative policy laid down in 
statutes like the Human Right Commission Act. 
In family law in general gay and lesbian relationships are less publicly 
recognised. There are many strategies for dealing with this. Some suggest 
that gay and lesbian marriage should be made possible.74 Or, it may be 
possible to extent the recognition given to non-married heterosexual couples. 
The objection to either of these options that marriage and marriage 
substitutes are key parts of the structure of (hetero)sexism might be made 
by some. Indeed, imposing marriage on gay and lesbian relationships may 
be worse than not recognising them at all (if only for the reason of the 
implications of this for tax and social welfare benefits). 
These ways that law in society may affirm and recognise gay and lesbian 
lives present important challenges for the future. 
72 G v R, Family Court, Napier, 21 February 1989, FP 041 190 87, Judge B D Inglis 
QC. 
73 See Blllterworth 's Family Law Service volume 2, 6035-6. 
74 "Developments: Sexual Orientation and the Law" (1989) 102 Harv LR 1508, 1605 ff. 
-, .. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has dealt with the impact the law can have on sexuality. As 
Foucault has argued freedom to define one's own sexuality is constrained 
by the concept of sexuality itself. However, freedom to define one's own 
sexuality in an imperfect society may be consonant with legal recognition 
of sexuality, where sexuality is recognised and deployed by sources of 
power outside the law. In this case the law attempts to correct a power 
imbalance, and in fact become a form of resistance to the prevailing power. 
Though at first sight Foucault's analysis of sexuality suggests that the law 
should not recognise sexuality as Rubenfeld suggests, this should not be the 
ultimate conclusion. The law certainly should not contain regulation of 
consensual sexual activity ~his forces people to define their own sexuality in 
ways consistent with the 1aw. However, the law can positively affirm 
sexualities which would otherwise be the subject of prejudice and 
discrimination. If the law does not positively affirm sexualities in this 
category then it participates passively in the prejudice and discrimination. 
This paper has argued the case for a public and social recognition of gays. 
This recognition is important in order to fully recognise the dignity of gays 
and gay's rights to participate in society and fully express ourselves 
sexually. This aim is partly, but only partly, facilitated by the repeal of the 
sodomy laws. It needs to be carried further though into anti-discrimination 
Human Rights law, and beyond. 
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